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Delaware as Deal Arbiter 
Christina M. Sautter∗ 
Abstract 
 
Most would agree that the Delaware courts are the leading 
jurists in the resolution of corporate conflicts, particularly in the 
Mergers & Acquisitions (M&A) context. Arguably a greater role 
that Delaware plays is that of a norm setter, both with respect to 
the expectations of management conduct in the M&A process and 
with respect to deal terms, particularly deal protection devices. 
Like in any relationship, there is a “give and take” between 
practitioners and Delaware. That is, practitioners are “on the 
front lines,” often innovating with respect to new deal structures 
and deal terms. After some time, Delaware has the opportunity 
to review these innovations. As the Delaware courts render 
decisions, they comment on behavior in the deal process and on 
the legality of contractual provisions. In turn, practitioners take 
heed. They not only comply with these deal norms but, at least in 
the context of deal protection devices, they slowly push the 
boundaries. Delaware tends not to take issue with this boundary 
pushing as practitioners are largely complying with deal norms. 
This Article examines this relationship between practitioners 
and Delaware and argues that this circular effect has had the 
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result of eroding the very enhanced scrutiny standards which the 
courts have announced. 
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n. a person or force that settles a dispute or has ultimate 
authority in a matter . . . . (usu. arbiter of) someone whose 
views or actions have great influence over trends in social 
behavior: an arbiter of taste 
—The Oxford Dictionary of Difficult Words1 
 
There is no question that judges and the courts are 
considered the epitome of arbiters. The Delaware Supreme 
Court and Delaware Court of Chancery are no exception with 
many considering the Delaware courts the ultimate arbiters of 
corporate law.2 The uniqueness of Delaware courts and their 
expertise in the resolution of transactional law disputes, 
particularly arising from Mergers & Acquisitions (M&A) deals, 
 
 1. Arbiter, THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF DIFFICULT WORDS 29 (OXFORD 
UNIV. PRESS 2004). 
 2. See Randy J. Holland, Delaware’s Business Courts: Litigation 
Leadership, 34 J. CORP. L. 771, 771–72 (2009) 
Delaware’s courts offer litigants a forum with an extensive and 
well-developed jurisprudence that creates predictability and 
expediency in adjudication, allowing for efficient business planning. 
Delaware’s independent judiciary is essential to securing these 
values, and its practice of appointing judges and maintaining a 
balance of power between political parties on its high court has 
yielded dividends in both the expertise and independence of its 
judiciary. 
See also William H. Rehnquist, The Prominence of the Delaware Court of 
Chancery in the State-Federal Joint Venture of Providing Justice, 48 BUS. LAW.  
351, 354 (1992) 
In light of its 200 year history, the Delaware Court of Chancery 
deserves our celebration, not only as a unique and vibrant Delaware 
institution, but as an important contributor to our national system 
of justice. The Delaware state court system has established its 
national preeminence in the field of corporation law due in large 
measure to its Court of Chancery. 
Joseph R. Slights III & Elizabeth A. Powers, Delaware Courts Continue to 
Excel in Business Litigation with the Success of the Complex Commercial 
Litigation Division of the Superior Court, 70 BUS. LAW. 1039, 1039 (2015) 
(“Over its more than two-hundred-year history, Delaware’s Court of Chancery 
has emerged as the world’s most respected forum for adjudicating highly 
complex business disputes.”).   
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has been well documented.3 However, the Delaware courts’ role 
in M&A goes well beyond having the final “power to decide 
disputes” arising from these transactions.4 The judicial opinions 
rendered by the Delaware courts have not only announced 
intermediate and enhanced scrutiny standards but, possibly 
more importantly, have strongly hinted at the types of conduct 
which may or may not be acceptable in the negotiation of a 
transaction.5 As a result, Delaware6 has strongly influenced 
both the behavior of dealmakers7 as well as the contractual 
provisions to which dealmakers agree. In other words, Delaware 
is an arbiter in every sense of the word—it is not only settling 
disputes but also setting deal norms.   
In setting deal norms, there is a “give and take” relationship 
between dealmakers and Delaware.8 That is, practitioners are 
“on the front lines,” often innovating with respect to new deal 
structures and deal terms. After some time, Delaware has the 
 
 3. See Matthew D. Cain & Steven M. Davidoff, Delaware’s Competitive 
Reach, 9 J. EMP. LEGAL STUD. 92, 96 (2012) (concluding through empirical 
analysis that Delaware dominates the law and adjudication of merger 
agreements in economically significant transactions); John C. Coates, IV & 
John F. Cogan, Jr., Managing Disputes Through Contract: Evidence from 
M&A, 2 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 295, 298 (2012) (finding that Delaware dominates 
as the choice of forum in M&A agreements involving publicly traded 
companies); Jill E. Fisch, Leave it to Delaware: Why Congress Should Stay out 
of Corporate Governance, 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 731, 774 (2013) (explaining that 
recent studies have found that Delaware dominates as the choice of forum in 
M&A agreements). 
 4. Arbiter, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY (12th ed. 2019). 
 5. See infra Part IV.B for a discussion of these opinions. 
 6. Throughout this Article, Delaware will be used to refer generally to 
the Delaware courts, specifically the Delaware Supreme Court and the 
Delaware Court of Chancery. 
 7. For purposes of this Article, the term “dealmaker” will generally refer 
to those individuals largely responsible for the negotiation of M&A 
transactions, particularly the attorneys who are tasked with advising 
management, structuring the transaction, and drafting the ultimate deal 
terms.   
 8. See James D. Cox, How Understanding the Nature of Corporate 
Norms Can Prevent Their Destruction by Settlements, 66 DUKE L.J. 501, 513 
(2016) (“The court’s conclusions, which usually follow a narrative for the 
corporate actors’ behavior, signal what practices are acceptable and 
unacceptable, and communicate the norms that are indeed shared by others 
in the belief group.”). 
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opportunity to review these innovations. As the Delaware courts 
render decisions, they comment on behavior in the deal process 
and on the legality of contractual provisions.9 In turn, 
practitioners take heed. They not only comply with these deal 
norms but, at least in the context of deal protection devices, they 
slowly push the boundaries. Delaware tends not to take issue 
with this boundary pushing as practitioners are largely 
complying with deal norms. But the circular effect of this 
symbiotic relationship has had the result of eroding the very 
enhanced scrutiny standards which the courts have announced. 
This Article begins to track the effect that Delaware courts 
have had on dealmaking since the 1980s. In particular, this 
Article argues that, although the Delaware courts have 
announced enhanced or stricter scrutiny standards in the 
context of many mergers and acquisitions, in application the 
courts have evolved to a general reasonableness standard.10 
Instead of enforcing enhanced standards, the courts utilize their 
opinions to signal best practices in dealmaking.11 Practitioners 
have responded by operating pursuant to a set of norms in both 
the deal process and the deal terms. Generally, as long as deals 
reflect these norms, the courts will uphold the transactions and 
deal terms as reasonable.12 
Part II of this Article will examine social norms in the 
corporate context and describes the differences between 
obligational and nonobligational norms. Part III of this Article 
will recap the deal environment in the 1970s and 1980s prior to 
Delaware’s announcement of enhanced scrutiny standards in 
the M&A context. In addition, this section will briefly examine 
the business and legal communities’ reactions to leveraged 
buyouts, management-led buyouts, and hostile takeovers. Part 
IV of this Article will summarize Delaware case law announcing 
enhanced scrutiny standards. Perhaps more importantly, this 
Part will also discuss the norms the Delaware courts developed 
in announcing these enhanced scrutiny standards and will 
 
 9. See id. (commenting that judicial opinions provide a “mechanism by 
which corporate actors receive social cues”). 
 10. See infra Parts V.A., V.B. 
 11. See infra Part IV.B. 
 12. See infra Parts IV.B., V.A., V.B. 
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examine dealmakers’ reaction to these standards. Then Part V 
will briefly review the progeny of this case law to demonstrate 
how the Delaware courts have moved to a general 
reasonableness standard which, in turn, has permitted 
dealmakers to adopt more intricate and more severe deal 
protection devices. 
II. Corporate Norms 
As an arbiter, one of Delaware’s greatest contributions to 
M&A dealmaking has been Delaware’s ability to “influence 
social behavior” in dealmaking.13 That is, over the past three 
decades, Delaware has developed a comprehensive set of norms 
which attorneys have utilized in advising boards regarding 
fiduciary duties and in negotiating deal terms, particularly deal 
protection devices.14 In describing the role of courts in resolving 
corporate disputes generally, Professor James Cox describes 
courts as “norm engineers.”15 He compares judicial opinions to 
“sermon[s] on the good, the bad, and the ugly.”16 These sermons 
convey a set of norms which become perpetuated through 
constant dealmaking. Prior to tackling the development of these 
dealmaking norms, however, I must first address the structure 
of social norms generally in corporate law. This Article will 
follow Professor Melvin Eisenberg’s social norm framework 
which breaks norms down into obligational social norms and 
nonobligational social norms.17 
 
 13. Arbiter, THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF DIFFICULT WORDS 29 (OXFORD 
UNIV. PRESS 2004). 
 14. See infra Part IV. 
 15. Cox, supra note 8, at 514. 
 16. Id. 
 17. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate Law and Social Norms, 99 
COLUM. L. REV. 1253, 1257–62 (1999) (characterizing norms as obligational or 
nonobligational). Other corporate law scholars have used differing 
terminology for norms. For example, Professor Cox divides corporate norms 
into aspirational norms and arbiter norms. Cox, supra note 8, at 514–21. He 
provides the business judgment rule and the materiality standard as examples 
of aspirational norms as they “exist because they are believed to best serve 
societal objectives.” Id. at 519. On the other hand, arbiter norms “serve a quite 
different purpose: providing a party with a means to involve a court and 
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A. Obligational Social Norms 
Obligational social norms are practices that individuals feel 
required to obey even though the practice is not a legally 
enforceable rule.18 To determine whether a norm is obligational 
in nature, one may examine “whether a departure from the 
norm is likely to involve either self-criticism or criticism by 
others.”19 In Eisenberg’s framework, obligational norms further 
break down into internalized obligational norms and 
noninternalized social norms.20 
Just as the term suggests, internalized obligational norms 
are norms that individuals have internalized.21 In other words, 
these are norms that become a part of one’s character and 
prevent an individual from engaging in certain behavior or 
cause the individual to take some action.22 As Eisenberg says, 
some things are “simply not done” while others are “simply 
done.”23 For example, moral norms are internalized obligational 
norms but internalized obligational norms are not confined to 
just moral norms.24  Although, internalized obligational norms 
also “shape an actor’s social character.”25 Eisenberg provides the 
example of not picking pockets as an internalized moral norm 
 
thereby obtain an impartial assessment of distinct transactions.” Id. Cox uses 
the Revlon doctrine as an example of an arbiter norm. Id. at 519–20. The 
Revlon doctrine as a norm will be discussed more in Part IV.B.3 of the Article. 
In contrast, Professors Edward Rock and Michael L. Wachter utilized the term 
“nonlegally enforceable rules and standards” in their 2001 article exploring 
corporate norms. See Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Islands of 
Conscious Power: Law, Norms, and the Self-Governing Corporation, 149 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1619, 1641 (2001) (defining “nonlegally enforceable rules and 
standards”). 
 18. See Eisenberg, supra note 17, at 1257 (discussing the different 
categories of social norms). 
 19. Id. 
 20. See id. at 1258–61 (comparing internalized norms to noninternalized 
norms). 
 21. Id. at 1258–59. 
 22. See id. (explaining that some norms prevent actions even when an 
individual would obtain some benefit from taking the benefit and some norms 
encourage some actions). 
 23. Id. at 1259. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
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while dressing formally for the opening night of the 
Metropolitan Opera would be an internalized obligational norm 
that is not moral in nature.26 
Whether a party complies with a noninternalized 
obligational norm is a result of a cost-benefit analysis resulting 
from noncompliance.27  More specifically, individuals will weigh 
the costs resulting from nonadherence, which may include “loss 
of reputation, including diminished esteem, public shame (as 
opposed to feeling ashamed), and disdain.”28 An individual will 
compare these costs to the benefits of adherence, which may 
include “enhanced reputation, including increased esteem, 
public recognition, and social acceptance.”29 Despite these 
differences between internalized and noninternalized 
obligational norms, Eisenberg argues that in order for a norm to 
persist, enough individuals in a group must ultimately 
internalize the norm.30 
B. Nonobligational Social Norms 
Nonobligational social norms represent practices that 
someone “ought” to do.31 Eisenberg describes these as 
“behavioral patterns or practices” which either may or may not 
be “self-consciously adhered to” but which are not obligational 
in nature.32 Nonobligational norms include patterns of conduct 
or certain routines, such as taking vitamins each morning.33 
They further include certain usages in language.34 For example, 
with respect to the usage of terms in language, in the context of 
 
 26. Id.   
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. at 1260. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. at 1261. 
 31. Id.   
 32. Id. at 1256. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. Eisenberg provides an example from the Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts, which explains that “San Domingo mahogany” is a term used in the 
mahogany industry to describe high quality mahogany of a “certain density.” 
Id. However, San Domingo mahogany does not come from San Domingo. Id. 
Hence, the use of the term is a nonobligational norm. Id. at 1256–57. 
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deal protection devices, we refer to provisions prohibiting 
companies from actively soliciting, negotiating with, and 
providing information to third parties unless a target board’s 
fiduciary duties so require as no shop provisions.35 But as a 
technical matter, these contractual clauses include several 
different provisions: no shops (the anti-solicitation portion); no 
talks (the anti-negotiation and provision of information 
portion); and fiduciary outs (the portion allowing for 
negotiations if a board’s fiduciary duties would so provide).36 
Through the repeated use of the term “no shop provision,” 
dealmakers know that they are referring to not just 
anti-solicitation clauses but also to the no talk and fiduciary out 
clauses which virtually always appear with anti-solicitation 
clauses. Hence, using the term “no shop provision” is a 
nonobligational norm.   
Eisenberg has noted that most legal and economics scholars 
have focused almost exclusively on obligational norms.37 But, by 
focusing so narrowly on obligational norms, he argues that 
scholars miss the impact that nonobligational norms have on 
allowing certain behavior to take place.38 More specifically, 
 
 35. See, e.g., No-Shops and Their Exceptions, THOMSON REUTERS: 
PRACTICAL LAW (referring to covenants preventing the solicitation of other 
bids, the provision of information to other bidders, and the negotiation with 
other bidders as no shops) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 36. See Christina M. Sautter, Shopping During Extended Store Hours:  
From No Shops to Go-Shops—the Development, Effectiveness, and 
Implications of Go-Shop Provisions in Change of Control Transactions, 73 
BROOK. L. REV. 525, 534–35 (2008) (explaining the technical differences 
between no shops and no talks and further explaining the role of fiduciary 
outs). Even more technically, a no shop provision paired with a fiduciary out 
is a window shop provision. Id. at 534. As I have described in a previous article, 
fiduciary out provisions may be drafted broadly like the one in the text which 
allows action when a board’s fiduciary duties would require it. See Christina 
M. Sautter, Rethinking Contractual Limits on Fiduciary Duties, 38 FLA. ST. U. 
L. REV. 55, 80–83 (2010) (describing broad fiduciary outs in the context of a 
board’s recommendation to the shareholders). But they also can be drafted 
more narrowly and allow action if there is a superior offer or an intervening 
event or even more narrowly and allow action only if there is a superior offer. 
See id. at 83–87 (describing narrower fiduciary outs). 
 37. See Eisenberg, supra note 17, at 1261 (comparing obligational norms 
to legal rules). 
 38. See id. at 1262 (providing different examples to show the effect 
nonobligational norms have on behavior). 
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certain patterns of behavior become socially permissible 
because of the prevalence of that behavior.39 Finally, although 
social norms may be divided into obligational and 
nonobligational, norms are not necessarily so easily classifiable. 
That is, many norms could be both obligational and 
nonobligational in nature.40 To explain these two types of 
norms, Eisenberg used the example of the hand signal used to 
hitchhike.41 The usage of such a hand signal is a nonobligational 
norm.42 However, if a hitchhiker finds that they are unable to 
obtain rides without using the same hand signal, the hitchhiker 
would then feel obligated to use the signal.43   
III. Deal Environment Prior to Enhanced Scrutiny Cases 
To better understand the norms developed by Delaware, I 
am going to first recap the deal environment leading up to some 
of the most significant cases in M&A. These cases not only 
announced more enhanced levels of scrutiny but also set forth 
fundamental norms for dealmakers. Delaware developed these 
norms largely in reaction to the 1970s and early 1980s deal 
environment, which saw an abundance of transactions utilizing 
new deal forms. 
A. The Late 1970s and Early 1980s Deal Environment 
The late 1970s and early 1980s were marked by the 
development of leveraged buyouts (LBOs), management-led 
buyouts (MBOs), and hostile transactions.44 When speaking of 
 
 39. See id. (“[I]f smoking is a prevailing practice, it will be socially 
permissible.”). 
 40. Id. (indicating that failure to follow established nonobligational 
practices “will be treated as a defeat of justified expectations,” transforming 
practices into obligations).   
 41. Id. at 1257. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 1261–62. 
 44. See MICHELLE R. GARFINKEL, FED. RES. BANK OF ST. LOUIS, THE 
CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF LEVERAGED BUYOUTS  23 (1989), https://
perma.cc/5SF7-JURQ (PDF) (noting the increasing popularity of LBOs 
between 1979 and 1989); Joseph J. Allerhand & Bradley R. Aronstam, New 
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LBOs and MBOs during this period, many commentators 
attempted to distinguish between the two forms of 
transactions.45 As these commentators noted, there is no clear 
definition for these different transactions and, many times, 
there may be no difference between an LBO and an MBO.46 In 
a general sense, an LBO is the purchase of a target company (a 
standalone company or a subsidiary or division of another 
company) using a significant amount of debt financing (as much 
as 60 to 90 percent ).47 The assets of the acquired company are 
used to secure the debt so that following the purchase, the 
acquired company is highly leveraged.48 In a typical LBO, the 
target’s equity is owned by a smaller number of shareholders 
following the acquisition.49 Going-private transactions, in which 
a publicly traded company is purchased using a significant 
amount of debt financing is a typical LBO.50 Between 1979 and 
1985 there were 246 going-private transactions representing a 
total dollar value of almost $49 billion.51 More generally, during 
 
Wave of M&A Litigation Attacks Private Equity Deals, 238 N.Y.L. J. 9, 9 (2007) 
(“[M]erger and acquisition activity in the 1980s was epitomized by hostile 
takeovers and the ‘omnipresent specter’ of entrenched managed . . . .”). 
 45. See, e.g., GARFINKEL, supra note 44, at 23–24 (describing the 
ambiguous nature of LBOs). 
 46. See id. at 23 (“[T]here does not appear to be a single, clear definition 
of what an LBO really is.”). 
 47. See Matthew D. Cain & Steven M. Davidoff, Form Over Substance? 
The Value of Corporate Process and Management Buy-Outs, 36 DEL. J. CORP. 
L. 849, 855 (2011) (stating that debt financing accounts for 60 to 90 percent of 
financing); GARFINKEL, supra note 44, at 24 (stating that debt financing 
accounts for 80 to 90 percent of the funding for an LBO); JONATHAN 
OLSEN, FOSTER CTR. FOR PRIV. EQUITY & ENTREPRENEURSHIP, NOTE ON 
LEVERAGED BUYOUTS 1 (2002), https://perma.cc/L3PH-PQTR (PDF) (describing 
the general structure of LBOs). 
 48. See OLSEN, supra note 47, at 2 (noting that the acquired company 
“generates cash flows which are used to service the debt incurred in its 
buyout”). 
 49. See GARFINKEL, supra note 44, at 24 (reasoning that this is a 
distinguishing factor from other takeover and merger activities). 
 50. See id. (“In essence, the transaction involves a substitution of debt for 
equity.”). 
 51. See id. at 25 (presenting a table with LBO activity each year from 
1979 to 1988). The transaction and dollar value totals were achieved by adding 
the numbers for each year from 1979 to 1985. Id. As for total LBO activity 
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the 1980s, LBOs accounted for 24.5 percent of all acquisitions.52 
With numbers like these, there is no question that LBOs came 
to dominate the takeover market in the 1980s. 
In addition to LBOs, MBOs also became popular. MBOs are 
LBOs in which management of the target company is part of the 
buyout group and will have an equity stake in the target 
company post-closing.53 As a result of management’s 
participation in the acquisition, MBOs carry a high potential for 
conflicts of interest.54 MBOs are a subset of LBOs.55 Although 
technically not all LBOs are also MBOs, LBOs do still carry a 
risk of a conflicted board of directors.56 This risk arises mainly 
from the fact that management tend to keep their positions 
following an LBO.57 
 
(including MBOs), one study provides there were 903 between 1981 and 1985 
(the year in which the first Delaware case addressed LBOs) and there were 
2,497 LBOs between 1981 and 1990. See GEORGE P. BAKER & GEORGE DAVID 
SMITH, THE NEW FINANCIAL CAPITALISTS: KOHLBERG KRAVIS ROBERTS AND THE 
CREATION OF CORPORATE VALUE 23 (1998) (displaying a chart containing 
number of LBOs in the United States). 
 52. Cain & Davidoff, supra note 47, at 855. 
 53. See id. at 857 (describing an MBO as a transaction in which 
“[m]anagement, either alone or with another acquisition group, would acquire 
a company under their control by arranging debt financing in leverage ranges 
equivalent to an LBO”); Guhan Subramanian, Deal Process Design in 
Management Buyouts, 130 HARV. L. REV. 590, 591 (2016) (indicating that 
senior managers of a target company have a buy-side interest in MBOs). 
 54. See Subramanian, supra note 53, at 591 (“MBOs are conflict 
transactions because senior managers have a fiduciary duty to maximize value 
for sell-side shareholders but also have buy-side interest.”). 
 55. See Louis Lowenstein, Management Buyouts, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 730, 
782 (1985) (recognizing the “definitional problem” in differentiating LBOs and 
MBOs and stating “not all leveraged buyouts are management buyouts”). 
 56. See Daniel J. Morrissey, Law, Ethics, and the Leveraged Buyout, 65 
U. DET. L. REV. 403, 406–07 (1988) (describing fiduciary duty concerns with 
LBOs). 
 57. See, e.g., In re Lear Corp. S’holder Litig., 926 A.2d 94, 108, 114 (Del. 
Ch. 2007) (addressing conflict of interest in a LBO where the buyer entered 
into employment agreements with several officers and directors to retain 
positions post-closing); In re Topps Co. S’holder Litig., 926 A.2d 58, 82 (Del. 
Ch. 2007) (addressing a claim that existing management favored LBO buyer 
because it would allow management to retain their positions).   
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Not only did leveraged buyouts grow in the 1980s, but so 
did hostile transactions.58 One third of deals valued at $1 
million or more in the 1980s were hostile transactions.59 One 
study revealed that of the eighty-two acquisitions of Fortune 
500 companies which occurred between 1981 and 1985, almost 
half, or forty, “appear to have started out as hostile.”60 Many of 
these hostile transactions were highly leveraged, similar to 
LBOs and MBOs.61 
The LBOs, MBOs, and hostile transactions which came to 
dominate the 1980s arose in response to the 1960s conglomerate 
merger wave.62 During that period, “[e]xecutives filled boards of 
directors with subordinates and friendly ‘outsiders’ and engaged 
in rampant empire building. The ranks of middle management 
swelled and corporate profitability began to slide.”63 This was 
the perfect environment for highly leveraged deals and hostile 
transactions to take hold in order to “restructure” companies.64 
While earlier generations of managers were not open to using 
debt as a form of financing, this began to change in the late 
1970s and early 1980s.65 At the same time, private equity firms 
like Kohlberg Kravis Roberts were formed to engage in LBOs of 
inefficient, underperforming companies.66 Following an LBO, 
 
 58. Robert B. Reich, Leveraged Buyouts: America Pays the Price, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 9, 1989, at 32. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Randall Mørck, Andrei Shleifer, & Robert W. Vishny, Characteristics 
of Targets of Hostile and Friendly Takeovers, in CORPORATE TAKEOVERS: 
CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 102 (Alan J. Auerbach ed., 1988). 
 61. See PATRICK A. GAUGHAN, MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS, AND CORPORATE 
RESTRUCTURINGS 3 (3d ed. 2002) (noting “highly leveraged transactions that 
were common in the 1980s”). 
 62. See Timothy M. Hurley, The Urge to Merge: Contemporary Theories 
on The Rise of Conglomerate Mergers in the 1960s, 1 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 185, 
185 (2006) (stating the conglomerate merger wave “began quietly in the years 
following World War II and reached its peak in the 1960s and 1970s”). 
 63. OLSEN, supra note 47, at 2. 
 64. See BAKER & SMITH, supra note 51, at 4 (stating that the merger wave 
of the 1980s was a response to “management suffering from luxuriant 
decadence”). 
 65. See OLSEN, supra note 47, at 2 (stating that the new generation of 
management in the late 1970s was willing to use debt financing). 
 66. See id. (noting that many public companies were trading at a discount 
to net asset value at the time). 
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many acquired companies were broken up and sold off in pieces 
for a profit.67 
Like LBOs and MBOs, hostile transactions also were used 
to dismantle conglomerates in the 1980s. However, unlike LBOs 
and MBOs, hostile transactions, or at least hostile cash tender 
offers, first arose in the early 1960s.68 When they first arose, 
hostile cash tender offers often did not actually result in a 
liquidation of the target company’s assets.69 Instead, 
dealmakers used them as a way of quickly purchasing 
companies and building conglomerates.70 But, during the 1980s, 
many bidders engaged in hostile acquisitions with the end goal 
of selling off portions, or all, of the target company.71 Or, at least 
that was the perception that many had of the corporate raiders 
who had come to symbolize the 1980s.72 
 
 67. See id. (explaining that “[t]his ‘bust-up’ approach” characterized early 
LBOs). In addition, LBOs also included acquisitions of unrelated divisions or 
subsidiaries of conglomerates, which were being spun off in order for the 
company to acquire companies in a related line of business. See Leslie Wayne, 
Buyouts Altering Face of Corporate America, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 1985, at A1 
(attributing this new approach to regulatory changes from the Reagan 
administration). 
 68. For a detailed description of the growth of hostile cash tender offers, 
see Christina M. Sautter, Tender Offers and Disclosure: The History and 
Future of the Williams Act, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON MERGERS AND 
ACQUISITIONS 354 (Claire Hill & Steven Davidoff Solomon eds., 2016). 
 69. See Samuel L. Hayes, III & Russell A. Taussig, Tactics of Cash 
Takeover Bids, 45 HARV. BUS. REV. 135, 138 (1967) (presenting results of a 
study conducted in the 1960s which revealed that “two thirds of the acquiring 
firms retained at least 75% of the purchased assets five years after completion 
of the mergers”). 
 70. See Sautter, Tender Offers and Disclosure, supra note 68, at 356–58 
(describing the use of cash tender offers as a way of obtaining control). 
 71. See Mørck, et al., supra note 60, at 104 (“Bidders in hostile 
transactions may be more interested in shutting down, selling off, or 
redepreciating the physical capital of the target than they are in continuing 
business as usual.”). 
 72. See Delaware Bench, Bar Celebrate 225-Year-Old Chancery Court’s 
Evolution, 32 No. 7 WESTLAW J. DEL. CORP. 3, *1 (2017) (quoting Wachtell, 
Lipton, Rosen & Katz partner, Theodore Mirvis, as stating “[m]ost of the 
litigation of the 1970s and ‘80s involved such corporate raiders wanting to 
acquire control of companies so they could carve them up and sell off the pieces 
at a quick profit”). 
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B. Reactions to LBOs, MBOs, and Hostile Transactions 
Despite their popularity, the LBOs, MBOs, and hostile 
transactions which came to dominate the 1980s were met with 
mixed reactions from financial and business communities, the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), and academics.73 
Criticisms ranged from concerns regarding impact on the target 
company, including debt burdens, to concerns about the 
conflicts of interests inherent in many of the transactions. 
With respect to leveraged transactions, many were 
concerned with the amount of debt incurred by the target 
company. For example, in 1984, John S. R. Shad, the 
then-Chairman of the SEC, warned that bankruptcies may 
increase as a result of LBOs, MBOs, and leveraged takeovers.74 
He pointed out that significant past bankruptcies had occurred 
as a result of taking on a large amount of debt to finance 
“aggressive takeover problems.”75 Further, he explained that 
when a company has limited cash flow, “even modest business 
problems” become magnified.76 
An additional significant concern with leveraged buyouts, 
particularly MBOs, was potential conflicts of interests on the 
part of boards in evaluating such transactions. Unlike with 
traditional transactions, LBOs raise a particular set of issues 
for boards.77 Boards had to consider the timing needed to 
arrange financing and to fully negotiate all interests in the 
transaction.78 This could take between 90 and 120 days longer 
 
 73. See, e.g., Fred R. Bleakley, S.E.C. Chief Cautions on Leveraged 
Buyouts, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 1984, at D1 (noting that the SEC Chief “pointed 
out that . . . major past bankruptcies . . . had resulted from heavy debt 
incurred by aggressive takeover programs”); GARFINKEL, supra note 44, at 
26– 28 (referencing the concern that “LBO transaction[s] have no positive real 
effects on [a] firm’s output,” but rebutting those concerns by giving evidence 
that “LBOs can be productive”). 
 74. See Bleakley, supra note 73, at D1 (explaining that leveraged buyouts 
“will magnify the adverse consequences of the next recession or significant rise 
in interest rates”).   
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. See Carl Ferech, Leveraged Buyouts and the Board, 9 DIRS. & BDS., 
45, 46 (1984) (explaining concerns specific to LBOs). 
 78. Id. 
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than in a traditional transaction.79 Because of the time required, 
the company was then subject to a fair amount of uncertainty 
from various constituencies and the possibility that the 
company may receive other bids.80 
With any transaction, price is generally the most significant 
consideration. However, with LBOs and MBOs, what a group 
can pay is subject to “clear limitations,” including financing, 
whether the price is competitive, what bankers may consider to 
be fair, and the group’s “own requirements for a rate of 
return.”81 Inherent in all of these considerations are potential 
conflicts for management. Obviously, when management is 
involved in buying out the company, it is in the position to 
“influence the transaction” on multiple levels.82 Management 
may act to try and prevent third parties who have previously 
expressed an interest in purchasing the company from making 
another offer.83 Along these lines, the board of directors must 
evaluate whether other offers should be solicited, which the 
members of management who are part of the buyout group 
would likely fight.84 Practitioners recognized that because of 
these numerous potential conflicts it would be very difficult for 
management to remain objective.85 
With all of these concerns, the American Bar Association’s 
Subcommittee of the Committee on Corporate Laws of the 
Section on Corporation, Banking and Business Law even 
prepared guidelines for boards and management to follow in 
going private transactions.86 These guidelines included 
considerations of fairness of the price being received, a 
suggestion that outside shareholder votes should be considered 
 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Edward S. Smith, Getting to the Right Price: The CEO’s View of LBOs 
and the Board, 9 DIRS. & BDS., 47, 47 (1984) (“[S]ince incumbent management 
collectively end up as part owners of the newly formed business, it is 
impossible for them to be entirely objective.”). 
 86. See generally Am. Bar Ass’n, Guidelines on Going Private, 37 BUS. 
LAW. 313 (1981). 
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separately from the insider votes (but would not be conclusive 
regarding the outcome of the deal), obtaining expert opinions, 
and using independent directors to negotiate.87 These guidelines 
and other similar practitioner commentary acted as a set of 
norms before Delaware had an opportunity to review these 
various new deal forms. 
IV. Delaware’s Reaction to the “New” Deal 
Environment— Setting Deal Norms 
Although scholars have examined Delaware’s role in 
developing corporate norms generally, most scholars have not 
focused specifically on Delaware’s role in setting norms in M&A 
deals.88 This Part examines Delaware’s initial reactions to 
leveraged transactions and hostile transactions. In reacting to 
these transactions, Delaware is most well-known for 
announcing new enhanced scrutiny standards. But in creating 
these standards it also crafted a set of norms. As dealmakers 
have responded to these norms, the norms themselves have 
evolved. 
 
 87. See id. (promulgating guidelines).   
 88. See generally Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, 
Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1735 (2001) (arguing that corporate norms cannot be understood 
without understanding trust behavior); Cox, supra note 8 (arguing that courts 
should position settlements in the corporate norm which it wishes to uphold); 
Eisenberg, supra note 17 (exploring corporate norms generally); Jill E. Fisch, 
The Peculiar Role of the Delaware Courts in the Competition for Corporate 
Charters, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1061 (2000) (arguing that Delaware courts attract 
corporate charters and has developed a unique corporate lawmaking structure 
and process); Holland, supra note 2 (arguing that Delaware courts act to set 
norms through its jurisprudence that create “predictability and expediency in 
adjudication”); Rehnquist, supra note 2 (arguing that Delaware sets norms 
with its national superiority in corporate law); Edward B. Rock, Saints and 
Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1009 
(1997) (exploring norms in the context of MBOs); Rock & Wachter, supra note 
17 (arguing that corporations are governed mainly by norms which are not 
legally enforceable); Slights III & Powers, supra note 2 (discussing Delaware’s 
role as a leader in adjudicating corporate disputes). 
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A. What’s a Court to Do? 
It was against the above described dealmaking backdrop in 
the late 1970s and early 1980s that the Delaware courts finally 
were able to respond in the mid-1980s. However, as Professor 
Edward B. Rock describes in his famous article, Saint and 
Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?, which 
examined norm-setting in the MBO context, there was a 
significant lag time between the development and popularity of 
MBOs and the Delaware cases reviewing them.89 It is important 
to note, as Professor Rock does, that when a new transactional 
form (or provision) is at issue and is “rapidly developing,” courts 
are unable to review the forms or provisions in “real time.”90 As 
such, the courts are left in the position of playing catch up. 
When a court is playing catch up in the transactional law 
context, it will likely be restricted in aggressively policing a 
transaction structure or provision.91 As Professor Rock 
explained in the context of MBOs, by the time the Delaware 
courts were able to review MBOs and provide standards, 
dealmakers were already engaging in MBOs for over a decade 
and had completed hundreds of transactions.92 As such, the 
Delaware courts were not able to declare MBOs per se illegal.93 
Of course, if Delaware had had the opportunity to review MBOs 
earlier, it may not have declared the form illegal but it may have 
tightened the rules earlier and possibly differently. However, 
the lawyers had already been setting the “standards” for these 
 
 89.  See Rock, supra note 88, at 1095 (“Although MBOs of significant 
publicly held companies, as a transactional form, got going seriously around 
1981, the cases came so slowly that the defining trilogy of Macmillan, Fort 
Howard, and RJR Nabisco was not written until 1988 and 1989.”). 
 90. Id. 
 91. See id. (describing the consequences of the time lag between deal 
completion and judicial scrutiny). 
 92. See id. at 1096–97 (discussing the uncertainty of the law regarding 
MBOs at this time and the number of deals completed before Delaware had 
the opportunity to review MBOs). 
 93. See id. at 1097 (demonstrating how this lag in time “constrained 
judicial decisionmaking”). 
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deals in the absence of any judicial opinions on point.94 They 
were able to determine the structure, the typical merger 
agreement provisions, and the appropriate level of management 
oversight without judicial oversight. Hence, “what the business 
lawyer [told] the clients—rather than what the judge 
announce[d] to the world—is the law.”95 So, as Professor Rock 
argued, once the courts had the opportunity to review these 
deals, the courts were “influenced and probably constrained” by 
the deal lawyers’ standards.96 
This constraint echoes through judicial review of M&A not 
just in the context of MBOs. This constraint is particularly 
evident in the first Delaware Supreme Court case to review an 
LBO, Smith v. Van Gorkom,97 which will be discussed in more 
detail in the next section. Because of the constraint that 
Delaware uses, Delaware often speaks through dicta which 
become deal norms.98 In addition, and perhaps more 
importantly, the constraint Delaware exercises in upholding 
 
 94. See id. (indicating that “[b]y doing these sorts of deals, in the absence 
of controlling case law” lawyers played an integral role in shaping the legal 
landscape with regard to MBOs). 
 95. Id. at 1096. 
 96. Id. at 1097. Of course, this issue is not limited to Delaware courts, as 
all courts are interpreting laws not making them, and this interpretation often 
occurs years after people have begun to rely upon whatever has become 
commonplace practice relative to those laws. 
 97. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). 
 98. Delaware regularly speaks through dicta in corporate law more 
generally, not just in the M&A context. Two prime examples of Delaware’s use 
of dicta are In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006) 
and In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996), 
in which the courts addressed executive compensation and board oversight, 
respectively. In these cases, the Delaware courts set expectations (i.e., norms) 
for future board and executive behavior. See Mohsen Manesh, Damning 
Dictum: The Default Duty Debate in Delaware, 39 J. CORP. L. 35, 58 (2013)  
(“Disney’s judicially blessed ‘best practices,’ for instance, provided 
not-so-subtle notice of the conduct that will be expected of corporate directors 
in future lawsuits.”). These other areas of corporate law, however, do not 
reflect the same “give and take” relationship that exists in M&A between 
dealmakers and Delaware. This might be attributable to the M&A process 
itself, the contractual nature of M&A, and Delaware’s recognition that boards 
are in a better position to judge the merits of a merger than the courts are. Of 
course, as is discussed in this Article, Delaware will step in if the court 
determines there is a conflict or unfairness. 
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board decisions and contractual provisions as long as they more 
or less follow deal norms results in an overall erosion of 
enhanced scrutiny standards. 
B. The Trifecta of Cases in 1985 Laying the Foundation for 
Deal Norms 
The Delaware Supreme Court seemed to come out of the 
gate relatively strongly in reacting to the hostile transactions 
and leveraged buyouts which had come to dominate the deal 
landscape by the early 1980s.99 In a set of three cases in 1985, 
Delaware began to not only review hostile transactions and 
leveraged buyouts but to attempt to formulate some meaningful 
judicial review of M&A transactions.100 
1. Smith v. Van Gorkom 
The first case in 1985 was the Delaware Supreme Court’s 
seminal decision in Smith v. Van Gorkom.101 This controversial 
decision was significant for a number of reasons, the least of 
which being that it was the first decision in which the Delaware 
Supreme Court had the opportunity to review an LBO.102 
 
 99. See, e.g., Martin Lipton, Pills, Polls and Professor Redux, 69 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 1037, 1046 (2002) (explaining that the decisions in Van Gorkom, 
Unocal, Revlon, and Household “represented a set of compromises” in which 
Delaware “chose a middle ground”  rather than giving in to either corporate 
raiders, advocating for takeover defenses to be outlawed, or corporate boards 
requesting a deferential business judgment rule apply). 
 100. See WILLIAM T. ALLEN & REINIER KRAAKMAN, COMMENTARIES AND 
CASES ON THE LAW OF THE BUSINESS ORGANIZATION 533 (5th ed. 2016) 
(explaining that in a set of cases argued in 1985, the Delaware Supreme Court 
began a “single effort to bring meaningful judicial review to control 
transactions”). 
 101. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). 
 102. A search of both Westlaw and LexisNexis reveals that Smith v. Van 
Gorkom was the first Delaware Supreme Court case to not only contain the 
term “leveraged buyout” but to also review the sale process leading to the 
buyout. From my research, it does not appear that the Delaware Supreme 
Court had previously addressed MBOs either. The earliest Delaware 
Chancery Court case to address MBOs appears to have been the 1983 case of 
Field v. Allyn, 457 A.2d 1089 (Del. Ch. 1983). The Delaware Supreme Court 
affirmed that case per curiam for the reasons stated in the lower court’s 
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Followers of Delaware law are well-versed in the facts of Van 
Gorkom—a leveraged buyout of Trans Union negotiated by Van 
Gorkom, the CEO, with no oversight by Trans Union’s board.103 
In approaching Jay Pritzker, the buyer and a friend of Van 
Gorkom, Van Gorkom did not simply ask Pritzker about his 
interest in acquiring Trans Union in a LBO.104 Rather, he 
provided Pritzker with a per share sale pricing and a financing 
structure, none of which he had run by the board or senior 
management.105 Thus, the Delaware Supreme Court was not 
only faced with an LBO but one with a quite imperfect sales 
process. It was a case ripe for some preaching on what should 
have been done or, in other words, it was the perfect case to 
develop a set of deal norms. 
A point that is often overlooked in discussing these cases, 
particularly Van Gorkom, is the norms which had governed 
director activity prior to 1985. Namely, there was a 
“nonobligational practice norm that directors do not do 
much.”106 In the words of one practitioner, “[m]ost boards were 
not much more than rubber stamps. The CEO said, ‘Jump’ and 
directors were allowed just one question: How high? It wasn’t a 
matter of not arguing with the boss—you typically didn’t even 
question him.”107 Thus, Van Gorkom marked not only a 
fundamental shift in fiduciary duty law but a fundamental shift 
 
opinion and did not issue a separate opinion. Field v. Allyn, 467 A.2d 1274 
(Del. 1983). Accordingly, Smith v. Van Gorkom was the first Delaware 
Supreme Court opinion issued in which the court took on leveraged buyouts 
in any form. See generally Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858.   
 103. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 864–70. Of interest for this Article, the CFO 
briefly ran numbers to determine if an LBO was viable after seeing a “media 
article” about a management-led buyout. Id. at 865. In addition, Van Gorkom 
had rejected the idea of the sale of Trans Union being structured as an MBO 
because of the conflict of interest which would arise as a result. Id. at 865. 
 104. Id. at 866. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Eisenberg, supra note 17, at 1271 (“Although this norm was not 
obligational it had a significant effect on conduct, because it permitted a low 
level of directorial care by insulating directors who did not do much from both 
external criticism and self-criticism.”). 
 107. Roundtable: The Legacy of Smith v. Van Gorkom, 24 DIRS. & BDS. 28, 
33 (2000) (quoting Boris Yavitz). 
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in norms relating to directorial care.108 As Professor Eisenberg 
has written, the nonobligational “low level of directorial care” 
changed to an “obligational norm that requires a higher level of 
care.”109 
Instead of adopting a rule prohibiting LBOs, the court 
scrutinized the process, or lack thereof.110 In fact, the enduring 
legacy of Van Gorkom is the process, which the court implied 
the board should have followed in selling the company.111 In 
particular, the court focused on the board’s knowledge of Trans 
Union’s value and on its failure to inform itself regarding Van 
Gorkom’s “forcing” the deal and determining the price per 
share.112 In scrutinizing the process the court focused on the 
number of board meetings held, the length of those meetings, 
and the questions asked during the meetings.113 The court 
focused on the fact that the board did not have any documents 
relating to the proposed merger nor did it have a summary of 
the terms.114 Furthermore, they had to rely on a twenty-minute 
presentation by Van Gorkom regarding the content of the 
merger agreement but he had never read the merger 
agreement.115 Moreover, the court stressed that Van Gorkom 
 
 108. Id. (indicating that in the Van Gorkom decision, Delaware raised the 
threat of liability in order to force boards to put certain procedures in place). 
 109. Eisenberg, supra note 17, at 1265. 
 110. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 874–93. 
 111. See Robert T. Miller, Smith v. Van Gorkom and the Kobayachi Maru: 
The Place of the TransUnion Case in the Development of Delaware Corporate 
Law, 9 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 65, 73 (2017) (“Van Gorkom was an attempt 
by the Delaware Supreme Court to begin working out a regime to regulate 
negotiated transactions.”). 
 112. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 875 (Del. 1985). 
 113. See id. at 869 (stating that the meeting was two hours in length); id. 
at 875 (noting the meeting was called without providing the board members 
with a purpose for the meeting and that the board had never considered selling 
Trans Union prior to this one board meeting); id. at 877 (stating that the board 
had not asked any questions of the CFO regarding the “study” he had done, 
who had suggested the $55 price, nor the tax implications or how the acquirer’s 
share option was calculated).   
 114. See id. at 875 (noting “the total absence of any documentation 
whatsoever”). 
 115. Id. at 874. 
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had not told the board that the purpose of the meeting was to 
authorize a merger.116 
In addition, the court implied that the board should have 
asked for an outside valuation study.117 The court, however, 
specifically stated that such a study was not “essential to 
support an informed business judgment” and further 
emphasized that “fairness opinions by independent investment 
bankers are [not] required as a matter of law.”118 The court 
clarified that directors who were “familiar with the business of 
a going concern are in a better position than are outsiders to 
gather relevant information.”119 Despite this clarification, 
dealmakers have acted as though fairness opinions are required 
in almost every company sale.120 
It was not just the court’s statements about fairness 
opinions to which dealmakers reacted. Dealmakers were quick 
to take note of the entire opinion and to begin to advise their 
clients accordingly.121 Bayless Manning may best represent the 
 
 116. Id. at 867. 
 117. Id. at 876. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. See Steven M. Davidoff, Fairness Opinions, 55 AM. L. REV. 1557, 1560 
(2006) (noting that practitioners have treated fairness opinions as “virtually 
mandatory”). 
 121. I would be remiss if I did not address the controversial nature of Van 
Gorkom. This decision represented the first time that a board of directors of a 
public company was held monetarily liable solely for breaching the duty of care 
by not being properly informed. See Krishnan Chittur, The Corporate 
Director’s Standard of Care: Past, Present, and Future, 10 DEL. J. CORP. L. 505, 
522 (1985) (stating that Van Gorkom was the first case to impose liability on 
directors for a failing to perform a “reasonable inquiry”); Charles J. Hartmann 
& Pamela Gayle Rogers, The Influence of Smith v. Van Gorkom on Director’s 
and Officer’s Liability, 58 J. RISK & INS. 525, 528 (1991) (stating that Van 
Gorkom “appears to be the first case” imposing liability “solely on the basis of 
the board’s decision making processes” (citation omitted)). But see Cox, supra 
note 8, at 524 (stating that prior to Van Gorkom there were a “handful of cases” 
where the court found directors breached their duty of care but none of them 
“involved public companies”). Practitioners and academics alike criticized the 
decision, even calling it “surely one of the worst decisions in the history of 
corporate law.” Daniel R. Fischel, The Business Judgment Rule and the Trans 
Union Case, 40 BUS. LAW. 1437, 1455 (1985); see Bernard S. Sharfman, The 
Enduring Legacy of Smith v. Van Gorkom, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 287, 289 (2008) 
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reaction by lawyers when he stated, in an article published 
shortly after Van Gorkom, that “[t]he opinion is a recital of 
explicit and implicit do’s and don’ts.”122 In his article, Manning 
dissected the opinion, dividing the “do’s” and “don’ts” into two 
columns taking up almost six and a half law review pages.123 He 
explained that if dealmakers engaged in more activity under 
Column II (the “do” column) and less activity under Column I 
(the “don’t” column), dealmakers would earn a better “grade.”124 
However, the more they engaged in an activity listed in the 
“don’t” column, the more likely a court would be to find that 
management has acted in a grossly negligent fashion.125 
As Manning’s equation implies, the “do’s” and “don’ts” set 
forth in Van Gorkom are both a standard of conduct and a set of 
norms. More specifically, the court assembled a set of 
obligational norms—norms with which dealmakers felt obliged 
to comply. As practitioners moved forward in the wake of Van 
Gorkom, they had a checklist of best practices. They knew that 
the more they complied with this checklist, the more likely the 
transaction would be to pass Delaware’s scrutiny.126 Other 
practitioners were quick to acknowledge this checklist. For 
example,  other practitioners advised that following the focus on 
process in Van Gorkom, “[d]irectors will not be able to satisfy 
this requirement by initiating a series of cosmetic decisional 
processes . . . merely parading a set of investment bankers, 
attorneys, and accountants through boardrooms will not be 
sufficient to protect corporate directors from potential 
 
(noting that “from the beginning” the decision was “heavily criticized”). For a 
comprehensive listing of articles by both practitioners and scholars, see Miller, 
supra note 111, at 70 n.3. 
 122. Bayliss Manning, Reflections and Practical Tips on Life in the 
Boardroom After Van Gorkom, 41 BUS. LAW. 1, 3 (1985). 
 123. See id. at 8–14 (comparing actions that Van Gorkom disapproved to 
actions that should be taken by officers and directors). 
 124. Id. at 3. 
 125. See id. (noting that only performing a minority of the “do’s” would be 
“grossly negligent”). 
 126. See, e.g., Roundtable: The Legacy of Smith v. Van Gorkom, supra note 
107, at 32 (“The lesson for boards after this case is all about the process: Follow 
the right process and the board’s actions in takeover settings will be relatively 
free from attack.” (internal quotations omitted)). 
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liability.”127 Instead, they advised that boards must delve 
deeper and take the time necessary to understand reports, to 
read relevant documentation, to understand the background of 
the transaction, and to think about the decision they are 
making.128 In other words, there was a set process on this 
checklist. Delaware would be able to look at a new transaction 
holding the Van Gorkom checklist in their hands and compare 
the two transactions. The less the transaction had the bad 
qualities of Van Gorkom and the more the transaction reflected 
the norms set forth by the Supreme Court, the more likely the 
directors’ conduct would be to get the benefit of the business 
judgment rule. 
2. Unocal Enhanced Scrutiny Standard 
Van Gorkom was just the beginning of a big year for the 
Delaware Supreme Court in reviewing M&A transactions. 
About six months after its decision in Van Gorkom, the 
Delaware Supreme Court issued its now famous decision in 
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.129 The court addressed 
Unocal’s adoption of a self-tender offer which excluded Mesa 
Petroleum who had launched a two-tier front-end loaded tender 
offer for Unocal’s stock.130 The court stated that when the board 
is faced with a hostile takeover, it has an obligation to 
“determine whether the offer is in the best interests of the 
corporation and its shareholders.”131 Because there is a 
possibility that the board could be “acting primarily in its own 
interests,” the board’s decisions to take defensive measures to 
ward off a hostile takeover are subject to an enhanced standard 
 
 127. Herbert S. Wander & Alain G. LeCoque, Boardroom Jitters: 
Corporate Control Transactions and Today’s Business Judgment Rule, 42 BUS. 
LAW. 29, 40 (1986). 
 128. See id. at 40–41 (“Directors must also make an extended effort to 
become informed about the background of the decision to be made and to read 
and understand the relevant documents involved.”).   
 129. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). 
 130. Id. at 953 ([The issues are:] [d]id the Unocal board have the power 
and duty to oppose a takeover threat it reasonably perceived to be harmful to 
the corporate enterprise, and if so, is its action here entitled to the protection 
of the business judgment rule?”). 
 131. Id. at 954. 
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of review.132 More specifically, this enhanced scrutiny requires 
the directors to “show that they had reasonable grounds for 
believing that a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness 
existed.”133 Once the danger is established, the defense “must be 
reasonable in relation to the threat posed.”134 
In a later case, Unitrin, Inc. v. American General Corp.,135 
the Delaware Supreme Court clarified that the proportionality 
prong of Unocal breaks down into a two-step analysis.136 First, 
the court makes an inquiry into whether the defensive device is 
draconian, more specifically whether it is either coercive or 
preclusive.137 If the device is not draconian, then the court 
determines whether the defensive mechanism falls “within a 
range of reasonableness.”138 This Article is not going to address 
the norms arising in the context of hostile transactions. 
However, the Unocal/Unitrin enhanced scrutiny standard is 
significant as Delaware later extended this standard to deal 
with protection devices in negotiated transactions, which will be 
discussed in Part V.A. below. 
3. Revlon & the Maximization of Stockholder Value 
Less than one year after Unocal, the Delaware Supreme 
Court issued another legendary decision, Revlon, Inc. v. 
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.139 Like with Van Gorkom 
and Unocal, scholars of corporate law are well-versed in the 
facts of Revlon—Pantry Pride’s hostile takeover attempt of 
Revlon in which the Revlon board sought out a white knight.140 
 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. at 955. 
 134. Id. 
 135. 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995). 
 136. See id. at 1387–88 (noting that cases applying Unocal reveal a “direct 
correlation between findings of proportionality or disproportionality and the 
judicial determination of whether a defensive response was draconian because 
it was either coercive or preclusive in character”). 
 137. See id. (“[T]his Court has consistently recognized that defensive 
measures which are either preclusive or coercive are included within the 
common law definition of draconian.”).   
 138. Id. at 1388 (citations omitted). 
 139. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986). 
 140. Id. at 177. 
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The white knight, Forstmann Little & Co., and Pantry Pride 
ultimately ended up in a bidding war, in which the Revlon board 
of course favored Forstmann.141 In reviewing the board’s 
actions, the court stated that once the bidding war had begun, 
it was clear that Revlon was going to be broken up.142 At that 
point, “[t]he directors’ role changed from defenders of the 
corporate bastion to auctioneers charged with getting the best 
price for the stockholders at a sale of the company.”143 This 
obligation to maximize stockholder value became known as a 
board’s Revlon duties.144 Similar to the decision in Van Gorkom, 
Revlon duties focus on the process the board follows in selling a 
company.145 In other words, it created further obligational 
norms for companies engaging in a break-up of the company. 
However, since Revlon had not involved a friendly, negotiated 
transaction from the start, practitioners were not sure whether 
Revlon applied in those situations.146 What was clear was that 
Revlon applied in the context of hostile transactions, if the board 
adopted a defensive strategy resulting in a sale of control.147 
 
 141. See id. at 178 (“[T]he directors unanimously agreed to a leveraged 
buyout by Forstmann.”). 
 142. See id. at 182 (explaining that when Pantry Pride continued 
increasing its offers, “it became apparent to all that the break-up of the 
company was inevitable”).   
 143. Id. 
 144. See Clark W. Furlow, Reflections on the Revlon Doctrine, 11 U. PA.  J. 
BUS. L. 519, 521 (2009) (stating that the board’s fiduciary duties “are aimed at 
serving the short-term interests of the stockholders in achieving a transaction 
that will maximize the immediate value of their shares” and that these duties 
are called “Revlon duties”). 
 145. See id. (“Under current Delaware law, if a business combination is 
deemed to constitute a ‘sale of the company’ or a ‘sale of control’ it is governed 
by the Revlon doctrine.” (citations omitted)). 
 146. See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, What Triggers Revlon?, 25 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 37, 46 (1990) 
Can a company agree to be acquired in what used to be the 
traditional manner—that is, an agreement negotiated at arm’s 
length calling for a form of transaction, like a merger or sale of 
assets, that normally requires shareholder approval—without 
shopping the transaction or otherwise conducting an auction? 
 147. Revlon did not use the terms “sale of control” or “change of control.” 
However, those terms quickly came into use following cases such as Mills 
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The Supreme Court did not just announce an enhanced 
obligation to maximize stockholder value. It also provided 
extensive guidance on the deal protection devices, which the 
Revlon board had adopted in its negotiations and agreement 
with Forstmann.148 The Supreme Court applied the Unocal 
standard to these deal protection devices.149 More specifically, 
Revlon had granted Forstmann a lock-up option to purchase two 
of Revlon’s key divisions for a discount if another buyer acquired 
forty percent of Revlon’s shares.150 The court made clear that 
lock-ups were not per se illegal and that they could be used to 
help maximize stockholder value by drawing bidders into an 
auction.151 However, in Revlon, the lock-up was not used in that 
manner but rather it was used to shut down an active bidding 
process.152 The court found similarly with respect to a no shop 
provision and termination fee.153 It noted that no shops, like 
lock-up options, are not per se illegal but that the no shop, like 
the lock-up, ended the bidding rather than increased it.154 This, 
the court stated, was “impermissible under the Unocal 
standards.”155 
So, Revlon expanded upon the Van Gorkom checklist. 
Revlon not only created obligational norms for companies 
engaging in an auction, but it also created obligational norms 
 
Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261 (Del. 1989), Paramount 
Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989), and Paramount 
Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994). 
 148. See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182–84 (reviewing a crown jewel lock-up 
option, no shop provision, and termination fee).   
 149. See id. at 183–84 (stating that the merger agreement “was 
unreasonable in relation to the threat posed” and that the no shop provision 
was not permissible under Unocal). 
 150. Id. at 178. 
 151. See id. at 183 (noting that the use of a lock-up option had been 
approved in an earlier Delaware Court of Chancery case).   
 152. See id. (explaining that “measures which end an active auction and 
foreclose further bidding operate to the shareholders’ detriment”).   
 153. See id. at 184 (“The no-shop provision, like the lock-up option, while 
not per se illegal, is impermissible under the Unocal standards when a board’s 
primary duty becomes that of an auctioneer responsible for selling the 
company to the highest bidder.”). 
 154. Id. at 184. 
 155. Id. 
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for the use of deal protection devices.156 However, Revlon left 
open some significant questions for dealmakers and academics 
alike; namely, when was Revlon triggered and how exactly does 
a board go about satisfying its Revlon duties.157 It quickly 
became clear that Revlon applied in friendly, negotiated 
transactions involving a sale or change of control.158 The 
evolution of the deal norms regarding how exactly a board may 
satisfy its Revlon duties in a sale or change of control 
transaction will be addressed in the next Part. 
V. The Evolution of the Trifecta Deal Norms and Its Impact 
on Delaware Deal Law   
A. The Extension of Unocal to Deal Protection Devices and a 
Slide into Reasonableness 
Although Delaware developed the Unocal/Unitrin 
enhanced scrutiny standard in the context of hostile takeovers, 
in 2003 in Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc.,159 the 
Delaware Supreme Court made clear that this standard 
extended to deal protection devices in negotiated 
transactions.160 Moreover, Omnicare represented the first case 
in which Delaware found that a board may not completely 
lock-up a transaction in a non-change of control situation.161 The 
 
 156. See Furlow, supra note 144, at 521 (describing the nature of the duties 
arising under Revlon). 
 157. See J. ANTHONY TERRELL, REVLON IN REVIEW 1 (2016), https://perma.cc
/VMR6-YWSU (PDF) (describing questions in the aftermath of Revlon). 
 158. See, e.g., Barkan v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 567 A.2d 1279, 1286 (Del. 
1989) (applying Revlon to a negotiated sale of control); Mills Acquisition Co. v. 
Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1284–85 (Del. 1989) (applying Revlon to a 
negotiated transaction); Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 
A.2d 34, 42–44 (Del. 1994) (stating that Revlon applies in negotiated, sale of 
control transactions). 
 159. 818 A.2d 914 (Del. 2003). 
 160. See id. at 932 (analogizing a board’s decision to enter into deal 
protection devices to taking defensive measures in the context of a hostile 
takeover).   
 161. Barry G. Sher & Israel David, Deal Protection Provisions in Mergers: 
A Discussion of Omnicare v. NCS, in DIRECTORS’ FIDUCIARY DUTIES IN 
TAKEOVERS AND MERGERS 60 app. at 63 (2003), https://perma.cc/ZDU5-QZW5 
(PDF). 
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facts of Omnicare were quite unique. They involved the 
stock-for-stock sale of a financially distressed company, NCS, 
following a bidding process.162 Due to its financial situation, 
NCS was left with only one viable bidder who demanded a no 
shop provision, a force-the-vote provision, termination fee, and, 
most importantly, a voting agreement locking up sixty-five 
percent of the vote.163 The Delaware Supreme Court determined 
that these deal protection devices together acted as a “fait 
accompli,” leaving the minority shareholders with no viable 
option to reject the proposed transaction.164 As such, the court 
held that the transaction must include an effective fiduciary 
out.165   
Commentators feared that Omnicare would have a negative 
impact on the market for mergers.166 They predicted that 
dealmakers would use fewer and less restrictive deal protection 
devices.167 Commentators also quickly suggested that the 
controversial holding in Omnicare would be limited to its 
facts.168 This last prediction came true, at least in part, the 
following year, in Orman v. Cullman,169 when the Delaware 
Court of Chancery had its first opportunity to apply 
 
 162. See Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 920–22, 925 (describing NCS’s financial 
situation, its search for strategic alternatives, initial proposals received from 
Omnicare and Genesis, and stock-for-stock ratio). 
 163. See id. at 924–26 (describing terms of deal with Genesis). 
 164. Id. at 936. 
 165. See id. (describing need of an effective fiduciary out). 
 166. See Megan W. Shaner, Revisiting Omnicare: What Does its Status 10 
Years Later Tell Us?, 38 J. CORP. L. 865, 878 (2013) (explaining commentators 
believed that Omnicare would result in Delaware being an “option contract 
state” which would result in less bidding parties or lower prices being paid for 
targets); Steven M. Davidoff, The Long, Slow Death of Omnicare, N.Y. TIMES 
DEALBOOK (Aug. 28, 2008, 4:22 PM), https://perma.cc/F4KL-6CAN (stating 
that commentators thought bidders may bid less frequently due to a lack of 
certainty in transactions).   
 167. See Steven M. Davidoff & Christina M. Sautter, Lock-Up Creep, 38 J. 
CORP. L. 681, 702 (2013) (stating that practitioners were fearful that Delaware 
courts would “regularly scrutinize and strike down lock-ups, countering the 
trend in termination fee growth”). 
 168. See Sher & David, supra note 161, at 63 (describing various 
viewpoints in the wake of Omnicare, including that it may be limited to its 
facts and, thus, not have an impact on most transactions). 
 169. No. Civ.A. 18039, 2004 WL 2348395 (Del. Ch. Oct. 20, 2004). 
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Omnicare.170 Orman involved similar facts as Omnicare but 
there were some distinct differences. Namely, unlike in 
Omnicare, deal protection devices did not act as a fait accompli 
as the deal included a majority of the minority provision.171 
Thus, there was an effective fiduciary out in Orman. So, has 
Omnicare been limited to its facts? Many practitioners would 
say yes.172 But, in reality, the parties in Orman took note of the 
obligational norm to have an effective fiduciary out and 
incorporated that into their transaction.173 As such, the 
Delaware Court of Chancery was easily able to distinguish 
Omnicare because dealmakers complied with the obligational 
norm. 
In reviewing practitioner reactions to Orman, it is evident 
that a few other norms arose out of the case. First, Orman 
involved a voting agreement with an eighteen-month duration, 
which the plaintiffs had argued was unreasonable due to its 
length.174 The Chancery Court rejected this argument.175 
Practitioners interpreted this as “provid[ing] some comfort that 
a lock-up period of eighteen months will not be deemed 
unreasonable per se.”176 In addition, practitioners took a broader 
norm from Orman. That is, they interpreted the court’s decision 
as “confirm[ing] that there is no preference in the law for any 
 
 170. See id. at *5 (distinguishing the voting agreement in Orman from the 
voting agreement in Omnicare); see also E. Norman Veasey & Christine T. Di 
Guglielmo, What Happened in Delaware Corporate Law and Governance from 
1993–2004? A Retrospective on Some Key Developments, 153 U. PENN. L. REV. 
1399, 1461 (2005) (“Orman indicates a possible trend toward limiting the 
majority holding in Omnicare to its facts.”). 
 171. Orman, 2004 WL 2348395, at *7. 
 172. See, e.g., LATHAM & WATKINS LLP, CLIENT ALERT NO. 418, REFUSING 
TO EXTEND OMNICARE, DELAWARE CHANCERY COURT UPHOLDS 18-MONTH 
LOCK-UP 6 (2004), https://perma.cc/6Y54-XXHN (PDF) [hereinafter CLIENT 
ALERT NO. 418] (stating that the holding in Orman was “consistent with some 
commentators’ predictions that the Chancery Court would limit Omnicare to 
its facts”). 
 173. See Orman, 2004 WL 2348395, at *1 (noting that “the board had 
negotiated an effective fiduciary out”). 
 174. Id. at *8. 
 175. Id. 
 176. CLIENT ALERT NO. 418, supra note 172, at 6. 
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particular form of deal protection over any other.”177 They went 
on to explain that “assuming the overarching Omnicare/Unocal 
standards are satisfied, practitioners should have broad 
latitude in choosing what form of deal protection to use.”178 
In the years since Omnicare, practitioners have been 
careful not to completely lock-up deals in negotiated 
transactions.179 But anyone who thought that practitioners 
would respond with less restrictive deal protection devices were 
sorely mistaken. Instead, dealmakers answered by using 
combinations of devices to lock-up merger agreements as much 
as possible without violating Omnicare.180 In other words, so 
long as the suite of devices contained an effective fiduciary out 
dealmakers considered those devices to be consistent with the 
norms set forth by Delaware. But this is where the “give and 
take” between dealmakers and Delaware began to take effect 
and ultimately impacted the level of scrutiny applied to deal 
protection devices. More specifically, when these combinations 
of deal protection devices were challenged, Delaware generally 
responded by upholding the devices as being consistent with 
what is typical in the market and what Delaware had upheld in 
previous cases.181 What Delaware was really saying is that these 
devices were in line with the norms which had been developed 
via case law and the interpretation of those norms by 
dealmakers. 
By way of some examples, in 2015, in In re Zale Corp. 
Stockholders Litigation,182 the Court of Chancery rejected an 
argument that the no shop, matching rights, and 2.75 percent 
 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
 179. See Shaner, supra note 166, at 885 (describing practitioners’ reaction 
to Omnicare and how practitioners have drafted deal protection devices in a 
manner that they would not violate Omnicare). 
 180. Id. 
 181. See infra note 195 for examples of these cases. See also Megan W. 
Shaner, How “Bad Law, Bad Economics and Bad Policy” Positively Shaped 
Corporate Behavior, 47 AKRON L. REV. 753, 788 (2014) (describing how 
pre-Omnicare there was a focus on individual deal protection devices but 
Omnicare caused dealmakers and courts to consider the total package of deal 
protection devices). 
 182. Consolidated No. 9388-VCP, 2015 WL 5853693 (Del. Ch. Oct. 1, 
2015). 
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termination fee were unreasonable.183 The court specifically 
stated “[a] number of Delaware cases, however, have rejected 
similar, and even more stringent, collections of deal protection 
measures as a basis for a breach of fiduciary duty claim.”184 It 
went on to look favorably upon the board’s inclusion of a 
fiduciary out provision, among other factors.185 One of the cases 
on which the Zale court relied was Dent v. Ramtron 
International Corp.,186 in which the Chancery Court reviewed a 
challenge to a no shop provision, standstill provision, change in 
recommendation provision, information rights, and a 
termination fee.187 In upholding these devices, the court noted 
that the no shop provision was similar to ones the court had 
upheld in the past.188 The court also noted the inclusion of a 
meaningful fiduciary out provision, and, like Zale, stated that 
“[s]imilar, if not more potent, combinations of deal protection 
devices often have been upheld by this Court.”189 In upholding 
the matching rights in Ramtron, the court quoted both In re 
Toys “R” Us, Inc. Shareholder Litigation190 and In re 
Smurfit-Stone Container Corp. Shareholder Litigation.191 In 
upholding the devices in both cases, the Chancery Court relied 
upon the customary nature of the deal protection devices at 
issue.192 More specifically, in Smurfit-Stone, the court noted 
that the no shop and matching right provisions in the agreement 
 
 183. Id. at *16. 
 184. Id. 
 185. See id. (“[T]he Board’s successful inclusion of both a fiduciary out 
provision and a reverse termination fee twice as large as the termination 
fee . . . are indicative of good faith negotiating on behalf of Zale’s stockholders 
rather than bad faith.”).   
 186. No. 7950-VCP, 2014 WL 2931180 (Del. Ch. June 30, 2014). 
 187. Id. at *8. 
 188  Id. (“The no-solicitation provision at issue does not appear to deviate 
in any meaningful way from similar types of provisions that repeatedly have 
been approved by this Court.”). 
 189. Id. at *9. 
 190. 877 A.2d 975 (Del. Ch. 2005). 
 191. No. 6164-VCP, 2011 WL 2028076 (Del. Ch. May 24, 2011); see 
Ramtron, 2014 WL 2931180, at *9 n.32. 
 192. See infra notes 193–194 and accompanying text.   
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were “customary in public company mergers today.”193 
Similarly, in Toys “R” Us, the court stated that the termination 
fee and matching rights were “common contractual 
feature[s].”194 The listing of Delaware cases with comments 
similar to these could go on as the majority of cases in which 
there has been a challenge to deal protection devices invokes 
similar reasoning to these cases.195 
Since Delaware heavily focuses on what is customary in 
terms of deal protection devices, practitioners also focus on what 
is customary, or, in other words, what the norms for these 
devices are. For example, Westlaw’s Practical Law database 
 
 193. Smurfit-Stone, 2011 WL 2028076, at *21 n.141. In upholding the 
termination fee, the court in that case also stated that it had upheld “several 
termination fees of similar size.” Id. at *21. 
 194. In re Toys “R” Us, 877 A.2d at 1017. 
 195. See, e.g., In re BioClinica, Inc. S’holder Litig., No. 8272-VCG, 2013 
WL 5631233, at *5 (Del. Ch. Oct. 16, 2013) (“In fact, the allegedly 
unreasonable deal-protection devices—a no-solicitation provision, a poison 
pill, a reasonable termination fee, information rights, and a top-up 
option— have been routinely upheld by this Court.”); In re Novell, Inc. S’holder 
Litig., No. 6033-VCN, 2013 WL 322560, at *10 (Del. Ch. Jan. 3, 2013) 
The deal protection devices in the Merger Agreement—the no 
solicitation provision, the matching rights provision, and the 
termination fee—are customary and well within the range 
permitted under Delaware law. The mere inclusion of such routine 
terms does not amount to a breach of fiduciary duty. . . . Delaware 
courts have recognized that these provisions are common in merger 
agreements, and may sometimes be necessary to secure a strong 
bid. 
In re Atheros Commc’ns, Inc. S’holder Litig., No. 6124-VCN, 2011 WL 864928, 
at *7 n.61 (Del. Ch. Mar. 4, 2011) (upholding a no shop, five business days 
matching rights, and 3.3 percent termination fee, stating “Delaware courts 
have repeatedly recognized ‘that provisions such as these are standard merger 
terms, are not per se unreasonable, and do not alone constitute breaches of 
fiduciary duty,’” and there’s no evidence these provisions bar bidders); In re 
3Com S’holders Litig., No. 5067-CC, 2009 WL 5173804, at *7 (Del. Ch. Dec. 
18, 2009) (upholding a more than four percent termination fee, five business 
days matching rights, and no shop, stating “this Court has repeatedly held 
that provisions such as these are standard merger terms, are not per 
se unreasonable, and do not alone constitute breaches of fiduciary duty” and  
there’s no evidence these bar bidders); see also Christina M. Sautter, The 
Golden Ratio of Corporate Deal-Making, 41 J. CORP. L. 817, 845–55 (2016) 
(containing a chart setting forth Delaware cases available on Westlaw from 
2003 to 2014 in which there were challenges to deal protection devices, 
including the deal protection devices, and the outcome of each case). 
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includes a “What’s Market” database which summarizes deal 
provisions in recent deals.196 In addition, each year the ABA 
publishes a Deal Points Study summarizing provisions in public 
company deals.197 Moreover, over the years, numerous law firm 
memoranda and client materials have summarized recent deal 
protection devices and provided advice regarding the drafting of 
these devices.198 These types of publications and summaries 
help to reinforce and perpetuate deal norms and provide more 
of a basis for Delaware to uphold deal protection devices as 
being consistent with deal norms. 
But upholding deal protection devices on the basis that they 
are consistent with deal norms has a potentially detrimental 
effect. More precisely, it has resulted in a weakening of the 
 
 196. See What’s Market, THOMSON REUTERS: PRACTICAL LAW (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 197. See, e.g., M&A MARKET TRENDS SUBCOMMITTEE, MERGERS & 
ACQUISITIONS COMMITTEE OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION’S BUSINESS LAW 
SECTION, STRATEGIC BUYER/PUBLIC TARGET M&A DEAL POINTS STUDY (FOR 
TRANSACTIONS ANNOUNCED IN 2016), 43–77 (summarizing common wording of 
deal protection devices for transactions in 2016); M&A MARKET TRENDS 
SUBCOMMITTEE, MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS COMMITTEE OF THE AMERICAN BAR 
ASSOCIATION’S BUSINESS LAW SECTION, STRATEGIC BUYER/PUBLIC TARGET M&A 
DEAL POINTS STUDY (FOR TRANSACTIONS ANNOUNCED IN 2015), 37–72 
(summarizing common wording of deal protection devices for transactions in 
2015); M&A MARKET TRENDS SUBCOMMITTEE, MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS 
COMMITTEE OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION’S BUSINESS LAW SECTION, 
STRATEGIC BUYER/PUBLIC TARGET M&A DEAL POINTS STUDY (FOR 
TRANSACTIONS ANNOUNCED IN 2014), 22ND NATIONAL M&A INSTITUTE, Slides 
44–74 (2017) (summarizing common wording of deal protection devices for 
transactions in 2014). 
 198. See, e.g., David Fox & Daniel Wolf, Deal Protection: One Size Does Not 
Fit All, PRAC. L. (2010) https://perma.cc/H8PG-DDR2 (PDF) (discussing recent 
trends in deal protection and providing factors to consider in negotiating deal 
protection); Noah Kornblith, Break-Up Fees in Delaware: A Delicate Balance 
for All Parties, O’MELVENY & MYERS LLP (Apr. 10, 2015), https://perma.cc
/3QFD-AMA4 (discussing termination fees); LATHAM & WATKINS LLP, DEAL 
PROTECTION MECHANISMS (Feb. 2016), https://perma.cc/DE7P-65HW (PDF) 
(providing descriptions of common deal protection devices); Abigail Pickering 
Bomba et al., Termination Fees: Possible Expanded Judicial 
Flexibility— Comverge, Practice Tips and Ideas for Structuring, 19 THE M&A 
LAWYER 15 (Feb. 2015) (discussing termination fees generally, providing a 
summary of Chancery Court decisions, and providing tips for structuring 
termination fees). 
  
1304 77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1269 (2020) 
 
enhanced scrutiny standard.199 The Delaware courts have been 
extremely deferential in their application of the Unocal/Unitrin 
enhanced scrutiny standard to deal protection devices.200 Even 
though the courts, particularly the Court of Chancery, may use 
Unocal/Unitrin terminology such as “preclusive” or “coercive,” 
the court generally does not engage in an Unocal/Unitrin 
analysis.201 Instead, as alluded to above, it will uphold deal 
protection devices as reasonable largely because they are 
consistent with, or less restrictive than, a set of devices used in 
prior transactions.202 
In Lock-Up Creep, Professor Davidoff Solomon and I argued 
that this deferential approach, in turn, has led to more extensive 
and more intricate deal protection devices becoming standard 
market practice.203 We dubbed this phenomenon “lock-up 
creep.”204 In other words, the “give and take” between 
dealmakers and Delaware have resulted in a bit of a chicken 
and the egg situation. Dealmakers have followed Delaware 
norms and pushed the envelope ever so slightly while Delaware 
reacts in an extremely deferential fashion concluding that these 
practices are consistent with deal norms. Then, in turn, we have 
a slide into a reasonableness standard and lock-up creep.205   
 
 199. See Davidoff & Sautter, supra note 167, at 683 (“The Delaware Court 
of Chancery in a series of cases after Omnicare and perhaps in response, 
adopted deferential standards of scrutiny for lock-ups.”). 
 200. See id. at 703, 708 (“[The court] adopted what could be equated with 
a deferential standard for review of lock-ups.”). 
 201. See id. at 702–03, 706 (explaining that the Delaware Chancery Court 
will use “preclusive” or “coercive” terminology, but a review of the cases reveals 
the court is not using enhanced scrutiny). 
 202. See supra notes 179–195 and accompanying text for a discussion of 
this reasoning and supra note 195 and accompanying text for examples of 
additional cases utilizing similar reasoning. 
 203. See Davidoff & Sautter, supra note 167, at 683 (arguing that following 
Omnicare the Delaware Court of Chancery “adopted deferential standards of 
scrutiny for lock-ups. . . . [T]hese decisions opened up space for lock-up creep 
to occur”). 
 204. Id. at 681. 
 205. In Lock-Up Creep, we argued, 
Our review of [deal protection] cases thus leads us to conclude that 
repeatedly stating lock-ups are not per se unreasonable and 
continually upholding lock-ups so long as they are market terms, 
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B. The Evolution of Revlon—A Slide into Reasonableness 
Similar to Delaware’s slide into reasonableness in the deal 
protection context, a comparable slide has occurred in the 
instance of Revlon duties.206 In the years following Revlon, 
Delaware refined what actions were required of boards when 
Revlon is applicable. In these cases, Delaware shifted away from 
the auctioneering language, which Revlon seemingly required, 
 
the Chancery Court has abandoned enhanced scrutiny analysis in 
favor of a reasonableness analysis. Of course, one can argue this is 
circular. If reasonableness is a market standard, then the market 
can change. And change it did as we have seen. In the period during 
and after these decisions, we have seen the expansion of market 
creep. 
Id. at 708. But see Fernán Restrepo & Guhan Subramanian, The New Look of 
Deal Protection, 69 STAN. L. REV. 1013, 1023 (2007) (arguing that termination 
fee creep subsided by the 2000s).   
 206. Many commentators have argued that enhanced scrutiny standards 
have become nothing more than reasonableness standards. See, e.g., Iman 
Anabtawi, The Twilight of Enhanced Scrutiny in Delaware M&A 
Jurisprudence, 43 DEL. J. CORP. L. 161, 198–205 (2019) (arguing that the 
Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in Corwin ultimately erodes enhanced 
scrutiny standards); Lyman Johnson & Robert Ricca, The Dwindling of 
Revlon, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 167, 210 (2014) (stating that “continuing 
assertions about the Revlon duty imposing a higher ‘reasonableness’ standard 
of scrutiny than ordinary business judgment rule review, and requiring that 
directors carry an initial burden of proof, are, in the personal liability context, 
outworn and faulty doctrinal vestiges” (citation omitted)); Paul L. Regan, 
What’s Left of Unocal, 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 947, 951–70 (2001) (arguing that the 
added fiduciary protections Unocal and Moran v. Household International, 
Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985), promoted have essentially been eliminated by 
case law through the years); Andrew D. Kinsey, Comment, Hand-Waiving as 
a New Standard of Review: When Analyzing Matching Rights, Has the 
Delaware Court of Chancery Abdicated Its Review Process, 121 PA. ST. L. REV. 
907, 921 (2016) (arguing that although Delaware courts are supposed to use 
an intermediate standard of review on challenges to deal protection measures, 
the Delaware Court of Chancery dismisses matching rights without engaging 
in an analysis, which “stand[s] in stark contrast to how the courts have 
analyzed other deal protection measures”); Mary Siegel, The Illusion of 
Enhanced Review of Board Actions, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 599, 624 (2013) 
(arguing that the Unocal standard has developed to allow “boards—especially 
independent ones—to enact all but the most egregious defensive tactics under 
the veneer of judicial review”). 
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to a reasonableness requirement.207 Basically, boards satisfy the 
reasonableness requirement if they engage in the process (i.e., 
the norms) outlined initially in Van Gorkom and Revlon and 
further refined in their progeny in cases like Barkan v. Amsted 
Industries, Inc.208 and Lyondell Chemical Company v. Ryan.209   
Four years after Revlon, the Delaware Supreme Court 
issued its decision in Barkan in which it reviewed a challenge to 
an MBO and clarified its expectations for boards in exercising 
their Revlon duties.210 It famously stated that “there is no single 
blueprint that a board must follow to fulfill its duties” and that 
“Revlon does not demand that every change in the control of a 
Delaware corporation be preceded by a heated bidding 
contest.”211 The court went on to recognize that the corporate 
environment was dynamic and that dealmakers could be flexible 
in selling companies.212 This flexibility not only allows a 
company to engage in an active bidding process, in which case 
the company would be prohibited from favoring a certain bidder, 
but also to consider an offer from a single bidder.213 In the latter 
situation, the court indicated that if the board did not have 
“reliable grounds upon which to judge [the] adequacy” of a single 
 
 207. For example, the Delaware Supreme Court in Mills Acquisition Co. v. 
Macmillan, Inc. seemed to favor an auction but left the door open to use other 
methods of sale. 559 A.2d 1261, 1286–87 (Del. 1989). More specifically, the 
court stated, 
Directors are not required by Delaware law to conduct an auction 
according to some standard formula, only that they observe the 
significant requirement of fairness for the purpose of enhancing 
general shareholder interests. . . . We recognize that the conduct of 
a corporate auction is a complex undertaking both in its design and 
execution. We do not intend to limit the broad negotiating authority 
of the directors to achieve the best price available to the 
stockholders. To properly secure that end may require the board to 
invoke a panoply of devices, and the giving or receiving of 
concessions that may benefit one bidder over another. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 208. 567 A.2d 1279 (Del. 1989). 
 209. 970 A.2d 235 (Del. 2009). 
 210. Barkan, 567 A.2d at 1279. 
 211. Id. at 1286. 
 212. See id. (acknowledging there were “evolving techniques and financing 
devices”). 
 213. Id. at 1286–87. 
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offer, a canvas of the market would be required.214 However, if 
the board did have a “body of reliable evidence,” a canvas of the 
market is not needed.215 But the court warned that the 
“circumstances in which this passive approach is acceptable are 
limited” and that “‘[a] decent respect for reality forces one to 
admit that . . . advice [of an investment banker] is frequently a 
pale substitute for the dependable information that a canvas of 
the relevant market can provide.’”216 
Despite this warning, however, the court then concluded 
that the board in Barkan had reliable evidence in the form of 
the special committee’s advice from investment bankers, the 
fact that the market was aware that Amsted was “in play” and 
no other bidders had come forward, and that the tax advantages 
from the MBO offer allowed that offer to be higher than what 
other parties might possibly pay.217 Allowing for such “reliable 
evidence” in lieu of a more active bidding process further refined 
the norms relating to process when a company is in 
Revlon-mode. These norms allowed for latitude deferring to the 
board members who are in the trenches each day and recognized 
that not every sale lends itself to an active bidding process.218   
In the three-plus decades since Barkan, numerous other 
cases expanded upon Barkan’s “no single blueprint” format, 
endorsing a reliance on the board’s knowledge in lieu of a more 
active sales process.219 Like Barkan, a number of other 
Delaware cases have permitted negotiations with only a single 
bidder, including allowing a reliance on window shops and go 
shop provisions to provide reliable evidence regarding deal 
 
 214. Id. at 1287. 
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. (quoting Letter Op. at 19–20, In re Amsted Indus. Litig., No. 8224, 
1988 WL 92736 (Del. Ch. Aug. 24, 1988)),  
 217. Id. at 1287–88. 
 218. See Afra Afsharipour & J. Travis Laster, Enhanced Scrutiny on the 
Buy-Side, 53 GA. L. REV. 443, 465 (2019) (explaining that the Delaware 
Supreme Court has “reiterated that Revlon did not impose conduct obligations 
on directors”). 
 219. In a prior article, I argued that despite the language of many 
Delaware opinions which appears to favor more extensive sales processes, the 
courts continue to treat deals following less extensive sales processes the same 
as deals involving more robust sales processes. Sautter, supra note 195, at 834. 
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value.220 Like with deal protection devices, dealmakers have 
taken note of the norms set forth in the Revlon line of cases. For 
example, a 2007 Fenwick & West memorandum suggests that 
smaller microcap companies should engage in a pre-signing 
market check while larger public companies do not need to do 
so, particularly if they agree to a go shop provision.221 It further 
suggests soliciting strategic bidders (in addition to private 
equity bidders), unless there is a “reasonable, factual basis for 
[not] doing so based on current information.”222 In addition, 
Fenwick & West reiterates the lesson first learned in Revlon 
itself—that is, to treat all bidders fairly.223 
In 2009, in Lyondell, the Delaware Supreme Court further 
confirmed that “directors must ‘engage actively in the sale 
process,’ and they must confirm that they have obtained the best 
available price either by conducting an auction, by conducting a 
market check, or by demonstrating ‘an impeccable knowledge of 
the market.’”224 The court clarified the level of knowledge 
required when the issue is whether a board has acted in good 
faith to satisfy its Revlon duties.225 Like the process emphasized 
in previous cases such as Van Gorkom and Barkan, the court 
 
 220. See In re Plains Expl. & Prod. Co. S’holder Litig., No. 8090-VCN, 2013 
WL 1909124, at *6 (Del. Ch. May 9, 2013) (addressing challenge to a single 
bidder transaction and stating “a post-agreement market check can be an 
effective way to ensure that a company obtains the best price reasonably 
available”); Sautter, supra note 36, at 542–57 (describing the reliance on 
post-signing market checks and go shop provisions and summarizing relevant 
case law). 
 221. David W. Healey, Corporate and Securities Update: M&A 
Development-Deal Process and Protections (Netsmart, Lear and Topps): 
Lessons on What Not to Do When Selling Your Company, Fenwick & West LLP, 
1 (2007), https://perma.cc/FY7M-FKMD (PDF). 
 222. Id. 
 223. Id. 
 224. Lyondell Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235, 243 (Del. 2009) (citations 
omitted). 
 225. The Lyondell charter contained an exculpation provision which 
protected the directors from personal liability arising from a breach of the duty 
of care. Id. at 239. Accordingly, the issue before the court was whether the 
board had acted consistent with its duty of loyalty. Id. The Delaware Supreme 
Court noted that if the issue had been whether the board had acted with due 
care, it would not have had an issue with the Chancery Court asking for 
“additional evidence.” Id. at 243. 
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considered similar factors as well as the fact that there was no 
evidence the board was conflicted.226 More specifically, it 
focused on the number of times the board met, their awareness 
of the company’s value and the industry generally, their seeking 
out and following advice from financial and legal advisors, their 
attempt to “negotiate a higher offer” despite indications that the 
existing offer was a “‘blowout’ price,” and their approval of the 
agreement “because ‘it was simply too good not to pass along [to 
the stockholders] for their consideration.’”227 
Five years after Lyondell, in C&J Energy Services, Inc. v. 
City of Miami General Employees’ & Sanitation Employees’ 
Retirement Trust,228 the Delaware Supreme Court reviewed a 
case in which the Court of Chancery had “imposed a pre-signing 
solicitation requirement” despite the inclusion of a no shop 
paired with a fiduciary out.229 The court stated, “as the years go 
by, people seem to forget that Revlon was largely about a board’s 
resistance to a particular bidder and its subsequent attempts to 
prevent market forces from surfacing the highest bid.”230 The 
court went on to state that the target in C&J Energy Services 
had not erected such barriers to entry and there was sufficient 
time for another bidder to come forward.231 Of course 
dealmakers took note. A Skadden Arps memo stated that “C&J 
Energy confirms that the Delaware courts will not lightly 
interfere with a disinterested board’s decisions about how to 
pursue a change of control transaction.”232 More recently, the 
Senior Chairman of Sullivan & Cromwell stated that “[t]he 
general perception is that you do not [need to shop a company], 
provided that there are no obstacles of significance against 
 
 226. Id. at 243–44. 
 227. Id. at 244 (alteration in original). 
 228. 107 A.3d 1049 (Del. 2014). 
 229. Id. at 1069. 
 230. Id. at 1070. 
 231. Id. 
 232. Robert S. Saunders, & Arthur R. Bookout, Delaware Supreme Court 
Reaffirms Important Protections for Corporate Directors, SKADDEN, ARPS, 
SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM LLP (Oct. 22, 2015), https://perma.cc/ARS4-GSLK. 
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somebody coming in over the top.”233 Despite that auctioneering 
language in Revlon and statements in other Delaware cases that 
more robust sales processes are favorable, a norm has clearly 
developed in Delaware that negotiations with a single bidder 
are sufficient so long as there are no major impediments to 
another bidder emerging.234 
Many scholars, including myself, have spent countless 
hours researching and writing about the evolution of Revlon 
duties and many have come to the conclusion that Revlon has 
been eroded. To date, no one has specifically focused on deal 
norms as a path to the erosion although Professor Mohsen 
Monash has come close.235 In response to an argument that 
Revlon has been diminished throughout the years, Professor 
Monash argued, 
[i]n fact, rather than reveal the erosion of the doctrine, the 
lack of judicial enforcement may show the opposite: 
that Revlon, as a normative concern, is enduring and 
pervasive. To be specific, it may be the case that boards have 
fundamentally internalized Revlon’s core dictate—that 
directors’ sole fiduciary obligation is “to get[] the best price 
for the stockholders.”’ In an era of shareholder 
empowerment and intense investor activism, for better or 
worse, directors nowadays worship at the altar of 
shareholder value maximization.236 
Professor Monash is correct when he states that boards 
have internalized the duty to maximize stockholder value. 
Although he also is correct that companies generally value 
shareholder maximization over everything else, something else 
also has occurred. That is, dealmakers have internalized the 
process repeatedly set forth in the Revlon line of cases.237 These 
processes have become obligational norms. So much so that even 
in non-change of control transactions, dealmakers oftentimes 
 
 233. William D. Cohan, “Many, Many States Have Explicitly Rejected 
Revlon”: With Revlon for Sale, the Hostile Takeover Era Ron Perelman Started 
Comes to an End, VANITY FAIR (Nov. 15, 2019), https://perma.cc/286M-ZZA6. 
 234. See Sautter, supra note 195, at 856–62 (describing sales processes in 
twenty-eight Delaware cases). 
 235. See generally Mohsen Monash, Nearing 30, Is Revlon Showing its 
Age?, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 107 (2014). 
 236. Id. at 136 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
 237. See supra note 234 and accompanying text. 
  
DELAWARE AS DEAL ARBITER 1311 
 
follow the same deal process norms.238 As dealmakers have 
internalized these norms and followed a checklist which 
Delaware has continually emphasized, Delaware has repeatedly 
upheld these sale processes, or really lack thereof, as 
reasonable.239 Thus, there is a “give and take” between 
dealmakers following norms and Delaware’s continued focus on 
a board’s knowledge in lieu of a more robust sales process.240 
Combining this “give and take” with the fact that most 
companies include exculpation provisions within their charters 
has resulted in a shift back to a basic business judgment 
reasonableness standard.241 
 
 238. See, e.g., In re MeadWestvaco S’holders Litig., 168 A.3d 675, 685 (Del. 
Ch. 2017) (describing the lead-up to a stock-for-stock transaction in which the 
board held “at least six meetings,” hired outside legal and financial advisors, 
“received numerous valuations of the Company,” and “asked probing 
questions” regarding the potential merger). 
 239. See cases cited supra note 195 and accompanying text. 
 240. This “give and take” relationship between dealmakers and Delaware 
is analogous to the lawmaking partnership between the United States 
Congress and the United States Supreme Court in the context of federal 
securities laws, which Professor Jill Fisch has described. See Jill E. Fisch, 
Federal Securities Fraud Litigation as a Lawmaking Partnership, 93 WASH. 
U. L. REV. 453, 454 (2015) (stating that “it is well documented that Congress 
does not exercise exclusive federal lawmaking power. The federal courts play 
an important lawmaking role by interpreting federal statutes and creating 
interstitial law” (citation omitted)). Professor Fisch describes a collaborative 
relationship between Congress and the Court in which the parameters of 
private securities fraud litigation have developed. Id. at 469–74. More 
specifically, the Court and Congress have engaged in “sequential adjustments” 
with Congress adopting “responsive legislation” as a result of the Court’s 
lawmaking. Id. at 469–70. Professor Fisch explains that “a lawmaking 
partnership is characterized by a common set of policy objectives. This 
distinguishes the lawmaking partnership as a common enterprise rather than 
two actors that are competing or working at cross-purposes.” Id. at 470. The 
relationship between dealmakers and Delaware is similar as the Delaware 
courts and dealmakers are not competing entities. Although Delaware is 
ensuring the fairness of deals, Delaware is not trying to actively prevent 
transactions through its review. If anything, Delaware would like deals to 
move forward and close. Perhaps this very sentiment plays a role in Delaware 
upholding director’s actions so long as those actions are reasonable and are 
taken by non-conflicted directors.   
 241. See supra Part V.B. 
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C. The New Frontier: Delaware as Deal Arbiter Moving 
Forward 
To this point, I have focused on the development and 
evolution of deal norms from the 1980s through approximately 
2015. This is for two reasons. First, the historical approach is 
necessary in order to be able to evaluate the interplay between 
Delaware and dealmakers with respect to deal norms and to be 
able to view the “big picture.” Second, most of the Delaware 
cases developing the norms for Revlon and deal protection 
devices were decided prior to 2015 and involved pre-closing 
challenges to a board’s actions. These cases often resulted in 
disclosure-only settlements. In 2015, the Delaware Supreme 
Court fundamentally altered deal litigation with its decision in 
Corwin v. KKR Financial Holdings Inc.242 In that case, the 
Supreme Court upheld a lower court decision finding that the 
business judgment rule applies to transactions which have been 
“approved by a fully informed, uncoerced vote of the 
disinterested stockholders.”243 The Supreme Court made a point 
of stating that Unocal and Revlon were really only meant to 
provide “injunctive relief to address important M&A decisions 
in real time, before closing” and were not “designed with 
post-closing money damages claims in mind.”244 
Corwin came shortly after C&J Energy Services. In 
reversing the Chancery Court’s grant of an injunction in C&J 
Energy Services, the Supreme Court made clear that injunctive 
relief should be cautiously employed and only in instances to 
“preserve the status quo” until a full trial may occur to 
determine if a breach of fiduciary duties has occurred.245 The 
court further clarified that where the stockholders have the 
ability to vote no and there is no evidence that stockholders are 
inadequately informed or will be coerced into voting for the 
transaction, injunctive relief is not a remedy.246 Then, in 2016, 
 
 242. 125 A.3d 304 (Del. 2015). 
 243. Id. at 306. 
 244. Id. at 312. 
 245. C&J Energy Servs., Inc. v. City of Miami Gen. Emps.’ & Sanitation 
Emps.’ Ret. Tr., 107 A.3d 1049, 1072 (Del. 2014). 
 246. Id. at 1072–73. 
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the Chancery Court issued its decision in In re Trulia 
Stockholder Litigation.247 In that case, the court highly 
discouraged cases which result in disclosure-only 
settlements.248 Together, Trulia, Corwin, and C&J Energy 
Services, dissuade challenges to deal protection devices and a 
board’s actions under Revlon. However, it is too early to know 
what, if any, impact these cases will have on the deal norms 
which have been developed over the previous three decades. 
Along these lines, Professors Matthew Cain, Sean Griffith, 
Robert Jackson, and Steven Davidoff Solomon address the 
continuing vitality of Revlon in a forthcoming paper utilizing a 
sample of transactions occurring between 2003 and 2017.249 
Through an empirical analysis of proxy statements, they have 
found that Revlon transactions were “more intensely negotiated, 
involve[d] more bidders, and result[ed] in higher transaction 
premiums than non-Revlon deals.”250 Although C&J Energy 
Services and Corwin came at the tail end of their sampling, they 
did not find a substantial impact on deals announced after the 
two cases were decided.251 Indeed, they suggest that dealmakers 
who are planning transactions “may respond to norms more 
directly than changes in the law, and norms may change more 
slowly than law.”252 
So, will the three decades of developed norms change 
dramatically? It seems highly unlikely. These deal norms and 
processes have been firmly imbedded into dealmakers’ 
playbooks. Although dealmakers have slowly incorporated more 
intricate deal protection devices resulting in a lock-up creep,253 
 
 247. 129 A.3d 884 (Del. Ch. 2016). 
 248. See id. at 887 (stating that the Chancery Court would be “increasingly 
vigilant in scrutinizing the ‘give’ and the ‘get’ of [disclosure only] settlements”). 
 249. Matthew D. Cain et al., Does Revlon Matter? An Empirical and 
Theoretical Study (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 466/2019), 
https://perma.cc/KJ52-5ECF (PDF). 
 250. Id. at 1. 
 251. See id. at 17 (“Together [C&J Energy Services and Corwin] seem to 
restore Revlon to its original factual context: the doctrine remains available 
for an intervening bidder seeking an injunction against board conduct in a 
competitive bidding situation.”). 
 252. Id. at 49. They also suggest that it may take longer for dealmakers to 
“fully internalize Corwin.” Id. 
 253. See supra note 205 and accompanying text. 
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Delaware has repeatedly made clear that effective fiduciary 
outs must be included in transactions.254 The lack of an effective 
fiduciary out is exactly the type of egregious behavior that the 
Delaware Supreme Court suggests would be proper grounds for 
seeking and obtaining injunctive relief under C&J Energy 
Services.255 With respect to Revlon, it has already been 
diminished to a reasonableness standard with various types of 
sale processes satisfying the duty to maximize shareholder 
value.256 Delaware has repeatedly made clear that it would only 
step in if there was evidence of director conflict or of bidders not 
being treated fairly. Delaware will continue to be a deal arbiter 
by policing behavior and deal terms which are out of line with 
deal norms and by further setting norms by commenting on 
behavior that may not be a violation, but which may fall short 
of Delaware’s expectations.   
VI. Conclusion 
For decades, Delaware has been the ultimate arbiter in 
M&A conflicts in every sense of the word. Not only does 
Delaware act as an arbiter in the traditional sense of the term, 
reviewing the legality of sales processes and contractual 
provisions, but Delaware is the ultimate originator of deal 
norms. One cannot ignore the symbiotic relationship between 
dealmakers and Delaware when considering the development 
and evolution of deal norms.257 That is, dealmakers invent and 
transform deal structures and contractual provisions, 
particularly deal protection devices. After some time passes, 
Delaware has the opportunity to review these innovations.258 
Initially, in the 1980s, while reviewing leveraged and hostile 
transactions, Delaware announced stricter scrutiny standards 
 
 254. See, e.g., Dent v. Ramtron Int’l Corp., No. 7950-VCP, 2014 WL 
2931180 at *8 (Del. Ch. June 30, 2014) (noting the importance of a meaningful 
fiduciary out provision). 
 255. See supra note 245 and accompanying text. 
 256. See supra Part V.B. 
 257. See supra note 240 and accompanying text (describing the “give and 
take” relationship between dealmakers and Delaware). 
 258. See Rock, supra note 88, at 1095 (describing the significance of the 
time lag between when deals are made and when courts review those deals). 
  
DELAWARE AS DEAL ARBITER 1315 
 
beyond the business judgment rule.259 It also provided 
significant commentary on the “do’s” and “don’ts” of the process 
which should be followed in selling a company as well as what 
types of deal protection devices may pass muster.260 These “do’s” 
and “don’ts” act as obligational norms in the deal context. The 
story, however, does not end there. As dealmakers comply with 
these norms, two things occur. One is that dealmakers begin to 
push the envelope ever so slightly with respect to deal protection 
devices.261 When Delaware reviews those somewhat enhanced 
devices, they tend to uphold the devices as they are in line with 
the market and with the norms. Second, when Delaware reviews 
board actions taken during the sale process, Delaware will 
generally not take issue with those actions so long as they are 
largely in compliance with the norms that have been set forth 
over time.262 This complicity in the review of both deal 
protection devices and board conduct results in an erosion of 
stricter scrutiny standards to a reasonableness standard.   
 
 
 259. See supra Part III. 
 260. See Manning, supra note 122, at 3 (compiling a list of Delaware’s 
“do’s” and “don’ts”). 
 261. See supra Part V. 
 262. See supra Part V.  
